A bstract U nderstanding a text always dem ands knowledge o f its context. P ossible reaso n s why co n tex t is freq u en tly reg a rd e d as a su b o rd in a te p a rt o f in te rp re ta tio n are analysed. In terp retatio n w ithin a com m unicative p e rs pective, and facets o f co n tex tu alisatio n a re discussed; som e th eo retical aspects concerning contextual issues are clarified. The notion 'fram ing the text' is defended to em phasise that history is constructed and always p re supposes a perspective. Fram ing is a com prehensive ac tivity which adds complexity. Because it engages in his to ric a l in te rp re ta tio n a n d d e sc rib e s a sp e c ts o f th e various levels of context, o n e 's fram ing activity can be criticised and im proved. F ram ing arises from o scilla tio n b e tw een inten siv e in te rp re ta tio n o f d e ta ils and generalisation.
INTRODUCTION
The appeal to context in m atters of dispute about m eaning is a natural and obvious ly im portant feature of interpretation. The significance o f context has been stressed by all disciplines engaged in in terp retatio n . From psychological research into hu m an com m unicative behaviour and the phenom enon of m eaning (e g B ransford & * R evised version o f a paper read al a subgroup m eeting o f (he New T estam ent Society of South A frica held at U n isa on 27 S e p te m b e r 1991. P ie te r C raffert provided som e helpful references and H elen B otha som e meaningful criticism, for which I thank them.
Jo h n so n 1972; P alerm o & B ourne 1978:160-173) to fo lk lo re studies (B en-A m os 1983; H onko 1984 ) the concept context is constantly stressed. This em phasis seems to be related to the very structure of knowledge and understanding: Som ething o u t side the 'object' is need ed in o rd er to know or to un derstand. T he basic idea has been well expressed by O ng (1990:206): ...the notion of text, and its plasticity when subject to various forms of m ediated com m unication, is one...concept in need of m ore sensitive exam ination...an inscription is not fully a text until som eone reads it, th at is, until som eone produces from the w riter's text som ething non textual...T o do this req u ires a code th a t th e text itself does not p ro vide. Texts, as texts, are dependent on som ething nontextual. All text is pretext. U nless som eone has this extra textual code which m akes reading possible and applies the code, the physical inscription rem ains forever no m ore than a visible pattern on a surface.
T h e in d isp u tab le and indispensable role o f this no ntextual 'so m eth in g e x tra ', is usually referred to as context. However, context turns out to be a complex concept.
It may be possible to clarify som e of the problem s by analysing aspects o f the con cept context. A fter all, reflection on the conditions for understanding is very much part of the process itself.
M ore specifically, this study m ust be u n d ersto o d with referen ce to a clearly observable pheno m en o n in New T estam en t scholarship. T h e re is undoubtedly a strong em phasis on the im portance of context in this field of study. A few examples, w hich can be m ultiplied alm ost indefinitely, are M artin (1977:220-222) , R o b erts (1978:63-64), M albon (1983:223), V orster (1984:111) and B otha (1991a: 280, 287; 1991b: 296, 299) . No one seriously denies the contribution a n d /o r value o f context. D espite the affirm ation, w hat exactly is m eant by context is left unclear: Why it is im portant -in practice -usually turns out to be a rhetorical move to prop up o n e's interpretation. How context should be utilised for the proper interpretation of texts is seen as som ehow a comm on sense activity.
South-A frican New T estam ent research has been assessed as having a distinct perspective -alm ost an exclusive concern with literary and textual m atters (Elliott 1988 ; cf a sim ilar rem ark by M oore 1989:xiv n3). A motley array o f reasons can p ro bably be supplied, but this de facto slighting of context appears to be related to, or rath er, to be a sym ptom of a m isconception of history. In a defense of a 'historicized' approach to re ad er response gospel criticism, Beavis (1987) has com m ented on the assum ption that literary and historical criticism do not mix; a sentim ent that, disguised in various term in o lo g ies (sy n ch ro n y /d iach ro n y ; te x t/e x tra-te x t etc), is quite comm on. Yet these are activities that presuppose each other, neither of these
30
UTS 49/1 <t 2 (1993) perspectives can legitim ately function w ithout the o th er. In a sense, it is a false dichotomy (see, for instance, De Beaugrande & D ressier 1981:6-12 on the coheren ce and other standards of textuality; W inner 1990:221; Z im a 1981:103) .
I would like to argue that participating in historical activity, in a com prehensive, interpretive sense is more than of im portance to New T estam ent research. It relates to the very essence of understanding. Construing a text is always also construing its context. To underscore the fact that context is construed, actively m ade by the in ter preter, the notion of 'framing a text' will be developed. We fram e texts on the basis of relevance -consequently w hat we are and want to know are p art and parcel of the 'context' of the text. T hat 'fram ing' im plies an interplay with the various levels o f context as well as an active en g ag em en t in d escribing aspects o f th ese levels m akes it possible to discuss and criticise (to 'control') o u r fram es with evidence, in the sense of patterns of relationships through time. Why is it that history often seem s to be utilised in such a facile way? O r why is historical u n d erstan d in g red u ced to e n u m eratio n o f historical aspects w hich are usually considered to be clearcut 'd ata'? Why are texts often considered to be interpretable in them selves, with context only being added later, or called in to resolve difficult parts? In this section I identify three m etaphors (functioning as assum p tions) that possibly contributed to the shape of New T estam ent scholarship.
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SO M E C R IT IC A L CO N SID ER
H istory a s 'backdrop'
In his discussion about the 'stages' o f the interpretive process (as specifically related to the New T estam ent), M arshall (1977b:12) (M arshall 1977a: 126) . Historical 'evidence' (background studies) when used like a w ood-w orker uses nails, m akes context into a m ere step w ithin the in terp re tive process, accorded a role th at is rated anything from im portant, or even neces sary, to merely interesting and optional.
In the sam e volum e th a t M arshall co ntributed to, we find D ra n e 's (1977:117) statem ent: 'It is...essential for the stu d en t of the New T estam en t to be thoroughly fam iliar with the background of religious thought against which it was w ritten' (my italics T his is som ething lawyers know well; context is in principle infinitely expandable, lim ited only by th eir resourcefulness, th eir clients*^ re sources, and the patience o f the judge. T here is always m ore evidence th a t may b e a r in som e way o r an o th e r on the m eaning of the act or w ords at issue...C ontext is o ften th ought o f as a given, b u t lawyers know that it is produced, and th at it is not saturable. C ontextualization is never com pleted; rath er one reaches a point w here further contextualixation seem s unproductive. (C uller 1988:148) Sperber & W ilson 1986:5-6) and becam e particularly w idespread through the work of various scholars. A signi ficant motive in the developm ent and adoption of the m odel appears to be the fact that it was taken from electronic com m unication engineering in an effort to em ulate the hard sciences. In this p erspective, hum an co m m unication is b roken up into three domains, which however much qualified, rem ain separate. T he success of the m etaphor witnesses to the fact that similarities exist, but it rem ains a m etaphor. T o study hum an com m unication we need som ething that differs from the engi n e e r's m easuring instrum ents (see the im p o rtan t discussion by Sless 1986:10-23).
W hen studying ancient docum ents the research er actually functions as both tran s m itter and receiver within the com m unicative event. In o th er words, the transm is sion m etaphor deceives with regard to the active role that the in terp reter plays when in terp retin g , 'creatin g ' the a u th o r and the a u d ito r/a u d ie n c e . O n e does n o t first study the author, then the text and then the audience (or in any oth er order). One can only look at the audience with the help of the text -a text construed by the in terpreter. We only have a text-author and a text-audience.
Viewing the world as a neutral space in which discrete entities (objects, beings etc) occasionally act or exert influence on one a n o th er is necessary in o rd er to pic ding o f language and history. O ne does not e n te r a n eu tral space, one is already part of the process, as much constructed and constructing as the o th er parties.
'T ransm ission of inform ation' models usually m ake com m unication som ething clear and straightforw ard, ignoring or simplifying the inherent instability of hum an com m unication. They also often fail because of an underlying idea of disem bodied inform ation (which can somehow be extracted from the medium ), and linear, causal m odels fail because they alm ost always omit the com plexities and interrelated n ess o f the many com m unicative elem ents which are most crucial for understanding h u m an behaviour.
2 3 M eaning as system T he w id esp read influence o f S aussure in linguistics and literary th eo ries is well known, and also well deserved. Yet, the tendency of researchers to present contro versial id eas w ith o u t critical discussion c re a te s m ore havoc th a n illu m in atio n .
S aussure has fo rm u lated , am ongst o th ers, som e ra th e r lim ited and vague ideas, generating a w ealth of debate, but often with only a superficial understanding of the problem s (Saussure 1974; cf C uller 1976; Sless 1986:132-145; Coward & Ellis 1981: 162-164) . O ne particular concept has led to misconception, namely that m eaning is related to sharing in a system.
'Language exists in the form of a sum of im pressions deposited in the brain of each m em ber of a com m unity, alm ost like a dictionary of which identical copies have been distributed to each individual. Language exists in each individual, yet it is com m on to ail' (Saussure 1974:19) . This fundam ental assum ption has becom e very powerful.
Following Saussure and others who have em phasised the shared aspect o f lang uages (m eaning as system to refer to the collective n atu re of language) th ere has been a tendency to gloss over the breaks, fissures and chasms which characterise the in frastru ctu re of und erstan d in g in favour o f holistic (read m onistic) approaches.
T h ese approach es exam ine the n ature o f u n d erstanding and texts with constructs such as 'linguistic co m p eten ce', the 'logic of cu ltu re' o r 'discursive p ractices' -in short The System which answ ers all questions. The practical correlation of this as sum ption is that hum an action can be explained by reference to laws and initial con ditions, by 'discovering' ind ep en d en t unvariables; or by exposing essences ('d e e p ' structures). give insight into both its d eterm in an ts and its m eaning. 'T h at is, w ithout the his torical dim ension, which provides the context of a comm unicative act, the meaning of a comm unicative act cannot be fully or truly understood' (M ander 1983:11).
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SOME DISllNCTIONS
Thinking about context clearly dem ands some distinctions, and one frequently finds the distinction betw een micro and m acro context. Noting the distinction betw een the subpart of the universe of discourse as context of an utterance and the discourse shared, though often helpful, should not disguise the relationships and interrelation ships of aspects designated micro context. Thus, not only should the distinction be refined, but one should ask about the connections betw een facets o f a supposed con text, how they 'change' when 'm oved' from m acro to micro level, and how aspects mutually define and determ ine each other. In attem pting to rem ain aw are o f these difficulties, f suggest distinguishing betw een setting, environm ent and encyclopaedic
'Background studies* and New Testament interpretation or them atic knowledge. I will also add some rem arks about how it may be possible to do this sort of thing realistically and fairly.
No doubt should exist as to the fact th a t these 'fe a tu re s' d escribe m ore than m ere parts o f a process; they are aspects with substantiality in them selves, yet irre trievably interwoven with each other. Thus, the idea is not to create the im pression that contextualising is like assembling, building by taking blocks from the one 'level' for co n stru ctin g th e o th e r. T h e re is an extensive in terp lay b etw een the various 'levels', these distinctions are m ade for argum ent's sake.
The point I am trying to m ake has to do with the p henom enon th at context is often reduced to disconnected details. To counter this, the em phasis is on the im por tance of w orking with background aspects them selves in o rd e r to get a feeling for the interw ovenness of d ata selected for a context; not only interconnected, but rela ted to the environm ent in strange and unexpected ways. The dynamic side to the as pects selected for a constructed setting can be illustrated with referen ce to orality and literacy in antiquity. N otions like texts, tradition and even writing derive their m eaning from th e no rm ativ e cu ltu ral v alues w ithin w hich they occur. W hen it com es to New T estam ent docum ents we should not only bew are of our literate bias and assum ptions about com m unication implying inherent, constant and unchanging qualities, or, put differently, im puting contem porary notions to historical concepts, but should also relate our selected aspects to others; Talking about transm ission of traditions is also talking about ancient education, ancient literacy and ancient story telling (A chtem eier 1990; B otha 1990, 1992a) . A wide variety of inform ation in mem ory is needed to understand even simple events in the world. This knowledge cannot be stored in mem ory as a random col lection of isolated facts. If we are to be able to access and apply this general know ledge to new events, it m ust be o rganised functionally in m em ory. T h at is, the knowledge must be organised in mem ory so as to activate related inform ation that may be useful, m otivate inferences to fill in inform ation not explicitly stated, provide expectations about what may occur next, and call to mind previously understood epi sodes that contain sim ilar information.
Setting
The.se types of activities are basically the sam e when 'scientifically' interpreting ancient texts. W hat is different is the explicit intensification of aw areness and argu m ent called for. This is when the formal use of concise models and intense involve m ent with interdisciplinary research are o f the utm ost im portance (on these issues see Barton 1982:13-14; Elliott 1986; W hite 1986; R ohrbaugh 1987) .
Them es, events, actions and so forth in the n arrativ e/tex t to be interpreted can typically only be causally explained and the pieces of the story connected together to form a coherent w hole with additional knowledge about them , so that it is obvious that one needs packages of them atic knowledge, o r what S p erb er & W ilson (1986: 236) call 'encyclopaedic schem as' o r 'encyclopaedic e n trie s' (S p e rb e r & W ilson
1986:87-89). T his type of know ledge is relatively abstract, and is developed from many other settings involving oth er particular goals and actions. It provides connec tions betw een story elem ents and connections to related inform ation in memory.
T his process o f draw ing on re la te d know ledge to add to explicit inform ation, to m ake inferences, is vital to com prehending both textual m aterial and natural expe riences. 
Description (what was it like?)
T he spectres of m isapprehension and mystification haunt the in terp re ter u n relen tingly. O ne can only exorcise them with an attem pt at authentic description (R unciman 1983:223-300). Now, it is very difficult to say w hat is authentic, although the basic idea is obvious: O ur descriptions should also be valid for those we are describ ing.
T he o ften voiced d esp air at such an e n te rp rise reflects an illeg itim ate co n ception of 'telling it "from the native's point of view"'. In seeking to uncover such a 
SOME CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The communicative event as the aim of interpretation
A m ong the m onum ental consequences of E instein's theory of relativity is a funda mentally profound truth regarding com m unication and knowledge. By d em onstra ting the interactive effects betw een the observer and observed, m aking final m ea surem ents problem atic, Einstein opened the way to a theory of intersubjective con stitution of tim e-consciousness (Joas 1985:172-198; cf E instein 1973:290-323, 341-356, 360-377) . Less pon d ero u sly put, his w ork allows the insight th a t reality is C ritics such as Stout (1982 Stout ( , 1986 , Fish (1980:147-173; , K napp & M ichaels (1982, 1983, 1989 ) and particularly Rorty (1982 Rorty ( , 1985 have convinced me to give up on the quest for basic ground rules of rationality or criteria for public discourse as such. T here is no ultim ate perspective and consequently no true, final m ethod. In stead, as have been eloquently argued by many, we should cultivate a pragm atic ap proach.
Clearly, theoretical reflection is im portant. It can and does throw light on p rac tice, in the sense o f contributing to self-consciousness about definitions, categories and boundaries (L entricchia 1985) . But th ere is no project th at can govern in te r p re ta tio n s o f p a rtic u la r texts by ap p ealin g to an acco u n t o f (all and any) in te r such a m ethod is the goal o f C hom skian theory: the construction o f 'a system of rules that in som e explicit and w ell-defined way assigns structu ral descriptions to sentences', w here 'explicit' m eans m echanical (like an algorithm ) and the assigning is done not by the in terp re ter but by the system (Chomsky 1965:8) . T heoretical re flection in this sense strives for the impossible. It will never succeed simply because the data and the formal 'laws' necessary to its success will always be developed from within the context o f which they are supposedly independent. As Rorty (1982:162) puts it, '[t] here are no essences anywhere in the area. T here is no wholesale, epistemological way to direct, or criticize or underw rite the course of inquiry...It is the vo cabulary of practice rath er than o f theory...in which one can say som ething useful about truth.'
O ne should be a pragm atist. The interesting fact is that when it comes to in ter pretation we are, in any case, pragmatic. W hatever positions people think they hold on language, interp re tatio n , and belief, in practice we are all pragm atists. We all think language is intentional, and we all think our beliefs are true. In scientific con jecture, we may distinguish betw een speech acts and language, betw een having b e liefs and claiming to know, betw een having true beliefs and really knowing. W e do not practice such distinctions. Yes, a text can be anything that we want to make it.
But we never make it everything, we unceasingly make it som ething, and that som e thing is always som ething detenninate but never anything final. A text can be a lot of things, but not at the sam e tim e; final m eaning is always deferred, but determ inate m eaning is not (cf W asiolek 1983:140).
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Texts
The discussion in this section is prom pted by the well-known adage that New T esta Philology, traditionally the text-centred study o f language, as contrasted to ling uistics, which is speech-centred, has o f course been concerned with making ancient or recondite docum ents accessible to those for whom they are ancient or foreign or esoteric. T erm s are glossed, notes appended, co m m en taries w ritten, and, w here necessary, transcrip tio n s m ade and translations produced in o rd e r to produce an annotated, readable 're-presentation' of the text.
Leaving out o f the p icture the practical difficulties (which as we all know are not inconsiderable), this 'picture' of interpretation seems fairly clear and acceptable.
H ow ever, as G eertz has noted, when philological concern goes beyond routinised craft pro ced u res (au th e n tic atio n , reconstruction, an n o ta tio n ) to address itself to conceptual questions concerning the n ature of texts as such -th a t is, to questions about their principles o f construction, the why, how, and what for -simplicity flees.
The result is a shattering of philology, itself by now a near obsolescent term , into disjunct and rivalrous specialties, and most particularly the growth of a division betw een those who study individual texts (histo rians, literary critics) and those who study the activity o f creating texts in general (linguists, psychologists, ethnographers) . T he study of in scriptions is severed from the study of inscribing, the study o f fixed m eaning is severed from the study of the social processes th at fix it.
T he result is a double narrowness. N ot only is the extension of text analysis to nonw ritten m aterials blocked, but so is the application of sociological analysis to w ritten ones. 
The 'problem' of subjectivity
Clearly, when working with dated texts, with persons long dead, we are engaging in a hypothetical and im aginative construction w hen we 'com m unicate'. In a very real sense we have nothing but silent docum ents, apparently forcing us into a vicious cir (Hoy 1978:77) . But this is to move the problem only one step backward as one must still determ ine what the subject m atter at stake is, against which one can test the preunderstandings. H ow ever, for a large p art, the subject m atter of a text is a practical affair, concerning genre, structure, questions addressed and created by the text, elim inating irrelevant cultural references, constructing argum ents for one's choices and so forth.
Yet, this is w here at least two theoretical issues concerning o n e's approach to a text should be enum erated.
The first is a consent to self-censure (which we all share, at least in theory). We do need p reunderstan d in g , presuppositions and assum ptions to understand at all; that is not the issue. The problem is to critically relate to our assumptions. Serious and consistent historical work is clearly needed, but also about o n e's own position, perspectives and aims. 'Self-reflection and a clearer self-understanding are critical if the interpretive process is to realize its essential possibilities...In o rd er to u n d er stand the past, it is necessary to try to u n derstand o n e's own presuppositions and prejudgm ents in o rd e r to realize how these m ediate o n e 's percep tio n o f the p ast' (Hoy 1977:viii, 94) .
In short, the circular activity of one's reasoning seems vicious only A basic sequel concerning historical activity follows: acknow ledging th at the past is a different country -to adapt the famous adage with which a novel by H a rt ley (1963:9) opens: 'The past is a foreign country: they do things differently th ere' (cf also Low enthal 1985:28-34, 410-412) . 'H istorical study takes an interest in w hat is really new -that is, in what is unlike ourselves' (Hirsch 1985:196) .
T he study of history (or historical activity) is not a possibility o r condition for arriving at som ething (e g self-clarification), but is a fact, som ething going on any way. This is of course not a very useful rem ark, but at least it serves to raise the (ra ther im portant) question that what is really at stake can only be how it (history) can be meaningful and truthful.
The gehildeten Verachteren of history and historical understanding will be quick to point out that I am connecting two positions that (some would like to claim ) are in opposition, namely emphasis on the cognitive apriori and the priority o f historical in terp re tatio n . U nderlying my exposition is the conviction that th e fam ous sub jective-objective polarity is a plague that needs to be eradicated from our discourses.
The dichotomy: either ahisiorical unchanging canons of rationality or cultural relati vism is a dichotom y only when one adheres to a 'copy' theory of truth, 'the concep tion according to which a statem ent is true just in case it "corresponds to the [mind independent] facts"' (Putnam 1981:ix) . T here is an extrem ely close connection b e tween the notions of truth, rationality and values; betw een 'objectivity' and o n e's his toricity, not a cancellation of one by the o th er (on these issues see B ernstein 1983; Putnam 1981:103-216; Raval 1986:121, 103; H ernadi 1988:752) .
T he realisatio n that we are fully and com pletely enclosed by o u r history and that all o u r know ledge is m ed iated know ledge is a challenge: 'O u r intellect and understanding are bounded only by the limits o f the structures we can invent, and... T he notion of 'context' should not be pictured as som ething in itself. Such a dis tin ctio n oversim plifies ra th e r th an en h an ces critical and in terp re tiv e discussion, since the opposition betw een an a ct/ev en t and its context seem s to presum e that the context is given and determ ines the m eaning of the text/event. Context 'is not fun dam entally different from w hat it contextualises; context is not given but produced;
w hat belongs to a context is d eterm ined by interpretive strategies; contexts are just as much in need o f elu cid atio n as events; and the m eaning of a context is d e te r mined by events' (C uller 1988:ix) .
As C uller warns, we should bew are of the (im plied) suggestion of most uses of the term context: a suggestion of it being som ething static, real and to be discovered.
Criticism ( A dopting the notion of fram ing helps us to express the underlying relevance o f our interpretive activities.
Relevance
Describing interpretations as mapping of texts into language, Stout (1986:103) notes that not just any sort of text-m apping would ordinarily count as in te rp re tatio n . U tterly arb itra ry , p ointless m appings w ould not. T his sug gests...that even bad in terp re tatio n s can be recognized as interpetations only relative to interests and purposes o f some sort -relative to som ething th at would give them interest and point...abstracting from interest and purpose altogether produces mappings that are good for nothing.
4« HTS 4 9 /1 A 2 (1993) P JJBolha Stout (1986:115; cf also Raval 1986:125-126) that as it may, at issue is that o u r ethical and political conceptions are part of that which we bring to the text, and in terp retatio n , if we w ant it to be any good, forces those attitudes into our m ethodologies and aims. Explicitness about relevance ne cessarily asks for discussion and criticism of our interests, purposes and ideals.
SUMMARY
New T estam ent research is a m ulti-faceted and complex discipline. It is a historical d iscip lin e, in a com p reh en siv e sense, co n ce rn e d with th e social, psychological, ex p erien tial and religious m atters o f the p eo p le and th e ir activities th a t started Christianity.
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O ur interpretatio n s of their ventures and com m unications should dem onstrate th a t to re fe r to th e social and co n tex tu al use of w ords is not to sim plify in te r p retatio n or to cut down am biguity. In cu rren t critical debates, invocation of the social character of texts and of the need for reference to context often turn out to be a reductive move, based on the assumption that contextual determ ination will in fact produce final m eaning. Recour.se to social attitudes and usage, o r to authorial in tentions, or to underlying cultural scripts or codes, simply gives access to that which in them selves are divided and m ulti-layered and gen erate m ore com plex explana tions and realistic perceptions.
H istory opens com plexities rath er than narrowing down to univocal meanings. reader-text, etc) th at is lim ited according to various factors, and one has to shift point of view to change these limits. It also em phasises that one is feeling o n e's way, exploring, looking from the inside, so to speak, instead of knowing and looking at everything from above.
'To speak of the m eaning of the work is to tell a story of reading' (C uller 1982; 35) . O r, in my context, m aking a map ab o u t w here one was and how one got to w here one now happens to be. Most em phatically, I do not w ant to claim a new m ethod, but ra th e r to extricate our in terp retiv e activities from an obsession with m ethod. Instead of asking about the right m ethod, or objective results, it is m ain tained that the question of attitudes (such as a dem ocratic com m itm ent) determ ines m ethods and relevance of interpretation. Consequently, less negative and insulting activities, but m ore serious straining towards true contextual understanding. A criti cal comm unity is b e tte r than a knowing one. A critical community with good m an n ers b e tte r still. A nd, the best of w orlds w ould be one th a t is also historically minded.
I have provided an arg u m en t for an e la b o ra te and com plex interw eaving of questions and possible explanations concerning texts and their contexts which sees influences bouncing back and forth in intricate and unpredictable patterns.
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C onsider the previous sentence; It is a rath er nice exam ple of academ ic form u lation. W hat does it really say? N ot much: It says one does not know how events and texts affect another; they do, but we -or at least I -have not been able to figure out exactly how or exactly why. T o do so, is o f course to transcend humanity: vain and dangerous. O urs is to try, to attem pt understanding and explanation: creating our own texts through which we live our lives. Historical enquiry is the force which assists both understanding and self-understanding. 
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